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Abstract. In this work, we apply a common economic tool, namely
money, to coordinate network packets. In particular, we present a net-
work economy, called PacketEconomy, where each flow is modeled as
a population of rational network packets, and these packets can self-
regulate their access to network resources by mutually trading their po-
sitions in router queues. Every packet of the economy has its price, and
this price determines if and when the packet will agree to buy or sell
a better position. We consider a corresponding Markov model of trade
and show that there are Nash equilibria (NE) where queue positions and
money are exchanged directly between the network packets. This sim-
ple approach, interestingly, delivers improvements even when fiat money
is used. We present theoretical arguments and experimental results to
support our claims.
1 Introduction
In their seminal work, Kiyotaki and Wright [17] examine the emergence of money
as a medium of exchange in barter economies. Subsequently, Gintis [12,13] gen-
eralizes the Kiyotaki-Wright model by combining Markov chain theory and game
theory. Inspired by the above works, we propose the PacketEconomy where
money is used as a coordination mechanism for network packets and prove that
there are Nash equilibria where trades are performed to the benefit of all the
flows. In the PacketEconomy, specialization - the reason for the emergence of
money as per Adam Smith ([32, Chapter 4], cited in [17]) - originates from the
diverse QoS requirements of network flows. More precisely, various types of flows
differ in their tolerance for packet delays.
It is known that a large number of independent flows is constantly competing
on the Internet for network resources. Without any central authority to regu-
late its operation, the available network resources are allocated by independent
routers to the flows in a decentralized manner. In this environment an Internet
flow may submit at any time an arbitrary amount of work to the network. If
the packets of the flow are successfully delivered, the flow may continue with
the same sending rate or even gradually increase it. In case of congestion at one
or more nodes in the flow’s path, the flow experiences delays and packet losses.
Then, the flow is expected to reduce its packet rate with an appropriate flow
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control algorithm, like the AIMD-based algorithms for TCP-flows1. This way,
each flow independently decides on its submission rate. The apparent lack of
coordination between the independent flows leads the Internet to an “anarchic”
way of operation and gives rise to issues and problems that can be addressed
with concepts and tools from algorithmic game theory.
Two representative works on applying game theory to network problems
are [19,29]. Certain game-theoretic approaches to congestion problems of the
Internet, and especially the TCP/IP protocol suite, are discussed in [31,1,10,7].
A combinatorial perspective on Internet congestion problems is given in [16].
The focus of the above works and the present paper is on sharing the network
resources between selfish flows. In this work, however, we propose an economy
where packets belonging to selfish flows may interact directly with each other.
The use of economic tools like pricing, tolls and taxes as a means to regulate
the operation of networks and/or to support quality of service (QoS) functional-
ities in the presence of selfish flows is, for example, discussed in [27,11,5,4,20,22].
In particular, the Paris Metro Pricing approach - using pricing to manage traffic
in the Paris Metro - is adapted to computer networks in [27]. A smart market for
buying priority in congested routers is presented in [20]. In [5,4] taxes are used to
influence the behavior of selfish flows in a different network model. An important
issue identified in [4] is that taxes may cause disutility to network users unless
the collected taxes can be feasibly returned to the users. In our economic model
this issue is naturally solved; trades take place between the flows, so the money
is always in the possession of the flows.
In this work, we apply a common economic tool, namely money, to coordinate
network packets. This is in contrast to much of the existing literature, which
aims to impose charges on Internet traffic, and to our knowledge, this is the first
work to propose economic exchanges directly between packets. In particular,
we present a network economy, called PacketEconomy, where ordinary network
packets can trade their positions in router queues. The role of money in this
approach is to facilitate the trades between the network packets. Queue positions
and money are exchanged directly between the packets while the routers simply
carry out the trades. We show that, in this economy, packets can self-regulate
their access to network resources and obtain better services at equilibrium points.
Contribution. The main contributions of this work are:
• A new game-theoretic model representing network packets as populations of
rational agents. In this model a network flow is represented as a population
of in-flight packets that can make bilateral trades with other packets.
• Application of bilateral trades and virtual money at a microeconomic level
to support better coordination of rational network packets.
• A plausible model for a very important and challenging problem like TCP/IP
packet scheduling. The model may also apply to other decentralized coordi-
nation problems.
1 AIMD stands for Additive Increase Multiplicative Decrease and TCP for the Trans-
mission Control Protocol of the Internet protocol suite.
• Application of an interesting combination of ergodic Markov chains and
strategic games within a new context.
• Theoretical evidence and experimental results showing that the model has
desirable Nash equilibria.
Outline. The rest of this work is organized as follows. Preliminaries are given in
Section 2. In Section 3 we describe the PacketEconomy. Afterwards, we analyze
two representative scenarios of the PacketEconomy in Section 4 and discuss
the underlying packet scheduling problem in Section 5. The effect of trades in
the PacketEconomy is examined in Section 6. We then present an experimental
evaluation of the PacketEconomy in Section 7 and make concluding remarks in
Section 8.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present a brief description of concepts that are required to
understand the motivation and the results of this work. More precisely, we dis-
cuss some introductory concepts of game theory, TCP networking, and modern
Internet routers. Readers familiar with some or all of these topics may skip the
corresponding material.
2.1 Game Theory Terminology
For convenience we define some basic concepts of game theory and optimization
as they are used in this work. More details on these introductory concepts can be
found in any related textbook. A game is a mathematical model of the interac-
tion among rational, mutually aware players. In this work, selfish, strategic and
rational are used interchangeably to denote players whose objective is to maxi-
mize their own payoff. The payoff of each player is determined by the outcome
of the game, which in turn depends on the decisions (strategies) of all players.
A strategy defines a set of moves or actions a player will follow in a given game.
A mixed strategy is a randomized strategy that assigns a probability to each
pure strategy. The support of a mixed strategy is the set of actions to which it
assigns a strictly positive probability. A strategy profile is a set of strategies that
includes one and only one strategy for every player. Clearly, a strategy profile
fully specifies a single execution of a game. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy
profile were no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from tis strategy.
We also refer to the concept of a weak Pareto improvement, which (in this
context) is any change to the current strategy profile that makes every player at
least as well off and at least one player strictly better off.
2.2 Some TCP/IP Terminology
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) belongs to the Internet protocol suite
and is the main reliable connection-oriented data transmission protocol of the
Internet. TCP flows transmit their data by sending a series of packets. Assume
a TCP flow that is ready to send a large volume of data as a sequence of 220
packets, each of size 1024 bytes. In order to send the data in a controlled manner,
a first parameter w is used, called the size of the congestion window.
The TCP protocol dictates that the flow starts by submitting w packets to the
network and then either waits until either a packets arrival is confirmed, normally
by receiving a matching acknowledgement packet (ACK) within a certain time-
frame, or the time-frame passes, whereby the packet is considered lost. As soon
as the number of the in-flight packets of the flow is less than w, the flow submits
new packet(s); the result is that, at any moment in time, the flow can have at
most w packets in flight. Thus, the size w of the congestion window has a strong
impact on the transmission rate of a flow [15]. Consequently, the selection of an
appropriate value for w is a very critical task for each flow, and this is where the
AIMD (Additive Increase Multiplicative Decrease) scheme is useful.
The AIMD algorithm is the most popular procedure for a TCP flow to con-
stantly adapt its window size to the changing network conditions. The basic
principle of AIMD is that, for each successful packet delivery the flow increases
its congestion window size additively by an amount proportional to a parameter
α > 0 (usually α = 1) and for each lost packet, the flow decreases its congestion
window multiplicatively by a parameter β < 1 (usually β = 1/2). The values of
the α and β parameters have a decisive role on the behavior of the AIMD flow.
A large value of α and/or β makes the flow more aggressive, whereas a small
value makes it more temperate. More details can be found in common computer
networks books like [30,34].
2.3 Network Routers
Hardware-based routers, such as those commonly produced by Cisco, fall into
two large categories based on their maximum throughput: High-end routers and
medium/low-end routers. High-end routers are typically employed in backbone
networks and thus need to support extremely high throughput. To achieve this,
they employ fixed-function dedicated and highly parallel hardware computation
units (NPUs) as well as specialized high-speed memory (TCAM). However, this
comes at the cost of flexibility and customizability, as the algorithms which can
be used by the router while maintaining its high-speed processing as predeter-
mined and implemented into hardware. Some parameters may be configurable
but only to the extent predetermined by the manufacturer. Often, for the target
application these limitations may not be a problem, since backbone routers often
do not have enough context in order to make flow-dependant routing choices. For
example, one limitation which affects our system as well, is that it is impossible
to perform packet re-ordering within the queue (the queue is strictly FIFO). If
higher flexibility is desired, it is possible in many cases to use custom algorithms
within these routers, however this is done at the expense of bypassing a part of
the hardware-based pipeline through a software-based one. The immediate effect
is that throughput drops significantly.
While these trade-offs have to do with high-end backbone routers, lower-cost
middle- and low-end routers, which do not need to provide the same throughput
since they are typically used near the leafs of the network, largely do away with
the specialized and costly hardware implementation and use a software pipeline.
As a result, it is much easier to implement custom algorithms on this class of
routers.
3 An Economy for Packets
The PacketEconomy is comprised of a network model with selfish flows, a queue
that supports packet trades, a currency and a specific economic goal. The solu-
tion concept is the Nash equilibrium (NE), i.e., a profile of the game in which no
player has anything to gain by changing only his/her own strategy unilaterally.
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Fig. 1: The network model
with the flows and their pack-
ets, the router, and the router
queue.
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Fig. 2: The state of a router queue in two
successive rounds, t and t+1. Two trades
are performed in round t; one between the
packet pair (p1,p2) and one between the pair
(p4,p7).
The Network Model. We assume a one-hop network with a router R and
a set of N flows, as shown in Figure 1. This setting is equivalent to the common
dumbbell topology used for the analysis of many network scenarios, including
the seminal paper of Chiu and Jain [3] on the AIMD algorithm. The router R has
a FIFO DropTail queue with a maximum capacity of Q packets and operates in
rounds. In each round the first packet (the packet at position 0 of the queue) is
served. At the end of the round the first packet reaches its destination. Packets
that arrive at the router are added to the end of the queue.
Packet Trades. At the beginning of each round all packets in the queue
are shifted one position ahead. A packet that enters the queue in this round,
occupies the first free (after the shift) position at the end of the queue. After
the move and for the rest of the duration of the round, the packet that has
reached position zero is served. At the same time, the other packets in the router
queue are simply waiting. These idle packets can engage in trades. During each
router round a fixed number b of trading periods take place. In each trading
period the idle packets are matched randomly in pairs with a predefined pairing
scheme. Each packet pair can perform a trade, as shown in Figure 2, provided
the negotiation performed between them leads to an agreement. The way the
trades take place at a microeconomic level between paired packets resembles the
models of [12,17] where agents meet in random pairs and can make trades. In
the theoretical analysis we assume a random-pairing scheme, which corresponds
to a well-mixed population, where packets are equally likely to be paired with
any other packet.
Packet Delay. The packet delay dp of a packet p that starts at position k of
the zero-based queue and does not make any trade is k+1 rounds (Figure 3a). If,
however, the packet engages in trades and buys a total of rb router rounds and
sells rs router rounds, then its packet delay dp, including the time to be served,
becomes dp = k+ 1 + rs− rb rounds. A packet may have an upper bound dp,max
on its delay; for delays larger than dp,max the value of the packet becomes zero
and the packet will not voluntarily accept such delays (that is, it will not sell).
Details. The router operates in rounds and can serve one packet in each one.
All packets are assumed to be of the same size and no queue overflows occur.
In generating the random packet pairs the use of predefined pairing reduces
the computational burden and avoids stable marriage problems. We make the
plausible assumption that flows with different QoS preferences are competing
for the network resources. We also make the assumption that the preferences of
each flow can be expressed with a utility function for its packets. Thus, packets
with different utility functions will, in general, co-exist in the router queue.
Packet Values. For each packet there is a flow-specific decreasing value
function vp(d) which given the delay d of a packet reveals its value. The value
function of each flow must be encoded onto each packet and its computational
requirements should be low in order not to overload the router. A class of sim-
ple value functions are vp(d) = max{vmax − cp · d, 0} where cp is the cost per
unit of delay (Figure 3b). Anytime during the packet’s journey, its value can
be estimated via the vp(d) function. However, when the packet arrives at the
destination, its value is finalized.
In the PacketEconomy every packet has its compensatory price p. For prices
lower than p, the packet is ready to buy better queue positions and for higher
prices higher than p it is ready to sell its position, given that the extra delay will
not cause it to exceed its maximum delay limit.
Inventories. Every time a packet is delivered in time, wealth is created for
the flow that owns the packet. Each packet p has an inventory Ip(t) containing
two types of indivisible goods or resources; the packet delay dp(t) and the money
account ap(t). Note that delay bears negative value, whereas money represents
positive value. We assume positive integer constants sa, sb and sd, such that
ap(t) ∈ {−sa, . . . , sb} and dp(t) ∈ {0, . . . , sd}. The inventory also contains the
current position posp(t) of the packet in the queue (i.e., the remaining delay
until it is served) if it is waiting in the queue. When the packet reaches its
destination, the contents of the inventory of the packet are used to determine its
utility (amount of wealth). This utility is then reimbursed to the flow that owns
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Fig. 3: Delays and Packet Values.
the packet and a new packet of the same flow enters the queue. An inventory is
called admissible, if the delay of the packet does not exceed its maximum delay.
A packet would not agree to trade an admissible inventory state for a non-
admissible one. We assume that all packets start with an admissible inventory
when they enter the queue.
Benefit and Utility. Since a packet has two types of resources that bear
value, that is, the packet value and the budget of a packet, we define the notion
of the packet benefit as the sum of the value of a packet plus/minus the budget
of the packet. Then we use the benefit concept to define the utility function of
the packet. For fixed rate flows the benefit and the benefit rates are equivalent
and can either be used as the utility of the packet. For Window-based flows the
utility function is the benefit rate, i.e. the benefit per router round.
Trades. The objective of each packet is to maximize its utility. Thus, when
two packets are paired in a trading period, their inventories and their trading
strategies are used to determine if they can agree on a mutually profitable trade,
in which one packet offers money and the other offers negative delay. The obvious
prerequisite for a trade to take place is that both packets prefer their post-trade
inventories to their corresponding pre-trade inventories. For this to be possible
there must be “surplus value” from a potential trade. In this case both packets
can benefit, i.e., increase their utility, if they come to an agreement.
3.1 Flow Types and the Cost of Delay
The delay that a packet experiences has a direct impact on its value, which
is a decreasing function of the delay. This impact depends on the type of the
flow. Window-based flows employ a feedback-based mechanism, the congestion
window, which determines the maximum number of packets that the flow may
have in-flight. A brief description on these TCP/IP related concepts can be found
in Section 2.2. The consequence of using a congestion window is that there is
an additional, secondary, effect of the packet delay on the flow’s wealth. Every
packet that is in-flight occupies one of the available positions in the congestion
window of a window-based flow. The more one packet delays its arrival, the
longer a following packet will have to wait to use the occupied window position.
Therefore, the impact of packet delays for window-based flows is twofold; the
decreased value of the delayed packet and the reduced packet rate. On the other
hand, for rate-based flows which submit packets with some given rate, there is no
other consequence due to packet delays beyond the reduced value of the packets.
If d = dp(t) and p = posp(t) are the delay and the position of a packet, then
a trade that changes the delay to d′, also changes the value of the packet from
vp(d) to vp(d
′). For rate-based flows, the difference between these two values
determines the compensatory price for the packet.
Assume a rate-based packet p with balance α1 and delay d1 < dp,max − d,
for some d. When a trade changes the delay from d1 to d2 = d1 + d, then this
also changes the value of the packet from v(d1) to v(d2). The difference between
these two values determines the compensatory price p for the packet.
p = v(d1)− v(d2) = v(d1)− v(d1 + d) = cpd . (1)
At this price, the utility of the packet remains unchanged after the trade. A
packet would agree to sell for a price ρs > ρ, or to buy for ρb < ρ.
For window-based flows, however, the price estimation needs more attention.
In this case the average benefit per round (benefit rate) is an appropriate measure
for the utility of each packet of the flow. Assume a window-based packet p with
delay d1 < dp,max − d, value v1 = v(d1) and account balance α1. Before the
trade the utility (benefit rate) is r1 = (v1 + α1)/d1. If the packet agrees to
trade its position and to increase its delay by d, then the new benefit rate is
r2 = (v2 + α2)/d2. Let ρ be the compensatory price for the trade. Then, by
setting r1 = r2 we obtain
v1 + α1
d1
=
v2 + α2
d2
⇒ V − cpd1 + α1
d1
=
V − cp(d1 + d) + (α1 + ρ)
d1 + d
⇒
ρ = (V + α1)
d
d1
. (2)
The above expression for the price ensures that the utility function of the packet
remains unchanged. A packet would agree to sell its position, for a price ρs > ρ,
or to buy a position (d < 0) for ρb < ρ.
4 Equilibria with Monetary Trades
In this section, we illustrate the PacketEconomy approach in two representa-
tive scenarios and discuss some auxiliary tools that are needed to support the
operation of the PacketEconomy.
4.1 Scenario 1
This is a simple scenario that produces an interesting configuration. It consists
of a set of N window-based flows fi, for i ∈ {1 . . . N}, each with a constant
window size wi, and
∑
i wi = q. When a packet is served by the router it is
immediately replaced by an identical packet submitted by the same flow. This
is a simplifying but plausible assumption. In reality, when a flow packet arrives
at its destination, a small size acknowledgment packet (ACK) is submitted by
the receiver. When the sending flow receives the ACK it submits a new identical
packet that immediately enters the queue. We assume b = 1 trading period per
router round but in general there can be any constant number of trading periods
per router round.
Failure states. For each packet there is a small probability pf for an extra
delay of df rounds, where df is a discrete random variable in {1, 2, . . . , q − 1}.
These delays correspond to potential packet failures of real flows, and occur
between the service of a packet and the submission of its replacement. The
presence of these failures will be useful to show the ergodicity of the Markov
process of the economy. By convention, the delay df is added to the delay of the
packet that has just been served. If more than one packets enter the queue at
the same time (synchronized due to delays), their order in the queue is decided
upon uniformly at random. A packet that does not participate in any trade and
does not suffer delay due to failure will experience a total delay of q rounds.
Packet states and strategies. The state τp(t) of a packet p in round t
is a pair τp(t) = (Ip(t), relp(t)), where Ip(t) is the inventory of the packet and
relp(t), which is meaningful only in failure states, is the remaining number of
failure rounds for the packet. The state of all packets of the economy in round t
determines the state of the whole economy τ(t) =
∏q−1
p=0 τp(t). From a packet’s
point of view, a trade is simply an exchange of its inventory state (budget,
delay and position) with a new one. Consequently, a pure strategy of a packet
is a complete ordering of the possible states of its inventory. In each round
the waiting packets move by default one position ahead and, thus, enter a new
inventory state. We assume that the packet ignores the impact of its state and
strategy on the state of the packet population. In every trading period the packet
simply aims at myopically improving its state.
A trade. Assume that two packets p1 and p2 trade with posp1(t) < posp2(t),
that is, p1 is closer to the serving end of the queue than p2. Then, in the next
round t′ = t+1, it holds that posp1(t′) = posp2(t)−1 and posp2(t′) = posp1(t)−1.
If ρ is the agreed upon price of the trade, then also ap1(t
′) = ap1(t) + ρ and
ap2(t
′) = ap2(t) − ρ. A prerequisite for the trade to take place is that ρs ≤ ρb,
where ρs is the asking price of the seller and ρb the offered price by the buyer.
To that end each packet has to calculate the utility loss/gain it will incur if it
trades its position, taking into account the impact on the packet value vp and
on the rate of the packet (for window-based flows).
Definition 1. Let τ(t) be the state of the economy in round t.
Lemma 1. τ(t) is an ergodic Markov chain.
Proof. Assume b = 1 trading period per round. In each round the economy moves
to a new state with transition probabilities that depend only on the current state
and the strategies of the packets. Let σp be a pure strategy of each packet p of
a flow and σ be a pure strategy profile of the whole economy. Then, there is a
corresponding transition probability matrix Pσ for the economy. Let σm be a
mixed strategy profile of the whole economy. Then the corresponding transition
probability Pσm of the economy for σm is an appropriate convex combination
of the transition matrices of the supporting pure strategies. In case of multiple
trading periods per round (b > 1), the economy makes b state transitions per
round.
The number of potential states for a packet is finite and, consequently, the
number of states for the whole economy is also finite.
Definition 2. A zero state τ0 is a state of the economy in which all packets
have zero budget and each packet p has delay dp(t0) = posp(t0) + 1, where t0 is
the current round of the router.
Assume that in round t the packet at position 0 fails for q − 1 rounds, in round
t+ 1 the next packet at position 0 fails for q− 2 rounds etc. Then after q rounds
all new packets will simultaneously enter the queue. Each packet will have zero
budget and by definition their ordering will be random. This also means that
for each packet p, dp(t) = posp(t) + 1. Thus, in round t + q the economy will
be in a zero state. The probability for this to happen is strictly positive and
thus each zero state τ0 is recurrent. Since the number of states of the economy
is finite, the states that are attainable from zero states like τ0 form a finite,
aperiodic, irreducible set of states. From the Fundamental Theorem of Markov
Chains (see for example [24] or [23]) we know that any finite, irreducible, and
aperiodic Markov chain is ergodic. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. For each pure strategy profile σ of the economy, there is a unique
stationary distribution piσ of the economy.
Proof. For each pure strategy profile σ, the Markov chain of the economy has
a finite number of states, is aperiodic and ergodic. Thus, it must have a unique
stationary distribution piσ (see for example [23, Theorem 7.7]).
By following this line of reasoning, an interesting argument which can be applied
is that given the stationary distribution of the economy, each trading period
becomes a finite state game.
Lemma 3. For every idle packet, each trading period of the economy corre-
sponds to a finite strategic game.
Proof. Let σm be a mixed strategy of the whole economy and P
σm the corre-
sponding transition matrix of the Markov chain of the economy. Note that Pσm
is a convex combination of the transition matrices Pσ that correspond to the
pure strategies σ in the support of σm. Moreover, let piσm be the stationary dis-
tribution of the Markov chain for transition matrix Pσm . We assume that the
utility of each player (packet) for the profile σm is the expected value of the
player in the stationary distribution piσm . In this way, we obtain for each trading
period a finite game where every packet of the queue is a player. The strategy
of the packet is its trading strategy.
This leads us to the following theorem, which holds under plausible assumptions.
Theorem 1. A NE of the economy exists where packets perform trades.
Proof. Since each trade is a finite game, the classic theorem of Nash [25,26]
assures that there is at least one mixed Nash equilibrium. However, the state
of the economy where no packet participates in trades is a trivial NE where
no trades take place. We have to show that there at least one more NE. A nice
property of the current proof technique (due to Gintis [12]) is that we can impose
conditions on the equilibrium point. We can assume a restricted version of the
economy, where each packet has a non-empty pure trading strategy set. In a
sense each packet is enforced to accept at least some types of profitable trades
every time it is possible.
In the restricted economy each round is again a finite game and, consequently,
it has a mixed NE. This time the NE has trades assuming that packets with dif-
ferent utility functions exist in the population. Assume now a NE state of the
restricted game in the original unrestricted economy. It can be shown that, as-
suming appropriate utility functions for the packets, if we relax the forced-trade
restriction, then no packet has an incentive to unilaterally change its strategy.
That is, there exists a NE with trades for the original PacketEconomy.
4.2 Scenario 2
We examine now a scenario where fiat money, that is, money without any intrin-
sic value [21], is used. Fiat money is by definition an object that is inherently
worthless. This means that in the game-theoretic context of the PacketEconomy,
fiat money will not appear in any utility function and will not be axiomatically
redeemable as anything else. We define and analyze this scenario to further em-
phasize the potential of money as a coordination tool.
We assume N players, each with two flows, a business flow and an economy
flow. Let m be a fixed quantity of fiat money available in the economy. Every
packet has a value function and the objective of a player is to maximize the total
utility per round from its two flows. As implied by its definition, fiat money is
not part of the utility function. Each player defines the trading strategies for
its flows. Economy flows accept fiat money to trade their queue position, while
business flows spend fiat money to reduce their delay. The money collected by
the economy flow is used by the player to finance the business flow.
The two flows of each player act as a team with the common objective to
maximize the total utility obtained by the two flows together. For simplicity we
assume window-based flows with fixed window size 1. This leads to a team game
(a concept first studied in [28]) where teams of two player-packets each, compete
for maximum utility. The packets of each team collaborate whereas the teams
participate in a non-cooperative game.
An important difficulty of such a team game for the PacketEconomy is the
lack of common information between the packets of the same team. A business
packet that is ready to spent money cannot be informed about the exact amount
of money its economy packet team member currently has. Analyzing the scenario
as a team game would be interesting but is out of scope for the present work.
Instead, we will simplify and formulate this setting as a normal strategic form
game.
The adapted economy. We define an adapted version of the economy where
each flow is an independent player and for each of the original flow pairs there
is a common deposit located at the common source of the two flows. Every time
a packet is served and before its successor is submitted, it interacts with the
deposit of the pair and liquidates or buys fiat money. There is a bound sd on
the amount of fiat money that can be stored in the deposit. An economy packet
liquidates and a business flow buys as much money as possible. The value of
fiat money for the transactions of the team members with the deposit is fixed at
(ce + cb)/2, where ce and cb are the costs per unit of delay for the two packets.
This assumption restricts the solution space of the game but admits us to analyze
it as a non-cooperative game. Note that if it were analyzed as a team game, as
long as the price ratio ρe/ρb would satisfy ρe/ρb < ce/cb, the flow pair would
gain from each trade.
Packet failures that increase the packet delay can occur just like in Scenario
1. However, in this scenario when both packets of a team are in a failed state
in the same round, then we assume that a team failure has occurred and the
team is reset. The deposit is set to zero. Since fiat money must be preserved in
the economy (else fiat money would disappear from the economy after a finite
number of rounds), the fiat money of the team is handed over to the router who
distributes it randomly in the next round to the packets in the router queue
(taking care not to violate maximum budget bounds of any packet).
Under plausible assumptions and similarly to Theorem 1 we get:
Theorem 2. A NE of the adapted economy exists where packets trade fiat money.
Proof (Sketch).
– The adapted economy can be modeled as a finite state Markov chain. The
proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1. The main difference is that the
state of the economy comprises also the state of the common deposits of the
flow pairs.
– For each mixed strategy of the economy, there is a corresponding stationary
distribution of the Markov chain of the economy. The proof is similar to the
proof of Lemma 2.
– At the stationary distribution, each trading period corresponds to a finite
strategic game. The proof is similar but more involved than the proof of
Lemma 3. First, we have to show that at the stationary state, each trading
period corresponds to the normal form game G defined above. Then, we
have to show that a NE of the normal form game corresponds to a NE of a
restriction of the original game, where the value of fiat money is fixed within
each flow pair.
– There is an equilibrium of the adapted economy, where fiat money circulates.
Theorem 2 shows that there is a NE where trades take place and fiat money
circulates in the adapted economy. Clearly, the equilibrium state of the adapted
economy is a valid state of the original economy which is based on the team-
game with the flow pairs. However, it is open to find out if the NE of the adapted
economy is a NE of the original economy too. Moreover, it is possible that the
free exchange rate for fiat money in the original economy may lead to more
efficient (better wealth rate) equilibrium points and/or NE than the adapted
economy.
4.3 Auxiliary Tools
Money as a Coordination Tool. The NE of Scenarios 1 and 2 show that, in
principle, money can be used at a microeconomic level to coordinate network
packets. By definition, the flows of the scenarios can only benefit through the
use of money; each trade is a weak Pareto improvement for the current state
of the economy. However, the benefit for the individual flows and the overall
network has to be further studied. We present some preliminary results on the
underlying single machine scheduling problem in Section 5 and the effect of
trades in Section 6.
Packet Pairing. A core operation of the PacketEconomy is the random pairing
of the packets that takes place in each trading period to generate the trading
pairs. We present an efficient parallel algorithm that can support the random
pairing procedure in real time.
The new algorithm is a parallel, or better, a pipelined version of the ran-
dom shuffling algorithm of Fisher-Yates, which is also known as Knuth shuf-
fling [35,18]. The Fisher-Yates shuffling technique was introduced in [9], later
Durstenfeld [6] proposed a corresponding O(n) algorithm, and finally Knuth [18]
popularized Durstenfeld’s algorithm. The random shuffling of Fisher-Yates is a
simple and elegant way to generate a random shuffle with a single pass over an
array of items. We call the new algorithm Pipelined Shuffling (see Algorithm 1).
Its core is a pipeline of q instances 0, 1, . . . , q − 1 of the Fisher-Yates algorithm
At time t, instance k is at step t + k mod q of the random shuffling algorithm.
If there is a processing unit for each queue position then the parallel step can
be executed in O(1) time. The pipeline delivers a random permutation in each
trading period. The random permutation can be used to obtain a random pairing
in O(1) parallel time with q processors.
Lemma 4. The Pipelined Shuffling algorithm runs in O(1) parallel time on a q
processors EREW PRAM and delivers a random shuffle every O(1) steps.
Proof. A running instance of the Pipelined Shuffling algorithm contains q inde-
pendent instances of the basic Shuffle algorithm. Each Shuffle instance is exe-
cuted by one of the q processors. From the pseudocode of the algorithms we can
conclude that each instance of the Shuffle algorithm is at a different round of its
main loop. Moreover, each instance of the Shuffle algorithm has its own vector of
q memory positions to store its current permutation and, thus, there is no pos-
sibility of two processors concurrently accessing the same memory position. In
Algorithm 1 Shuffling
1: procedure Shuffle(int[] a)
len = a.length;
for i from 0 to a-1 do {
// i==a-1 is a dummy loop
j = random int in i ≤ j ≤ q − 1;
exchange a[j] and a[i]
}
2: end procedure
1: procedure PipelinedShuffling(int[][] A)
len = A.length;
for i from 0 to len-1 do in parallel {
processor i: wait for i periods;
processor i: while (true) {Shuffle(A[i]);}
}
2: end procedure
each round, one Shuffle instance completes its execution and delivers a random
permutation of the q numbers {1, 2, . . . , q}.
The PacketEconomy packet pairing algorithm uses the delivered random permu-
tation to generate a random pairing in O(1) parallel time on dq/2e processors.
Theorem 3. A random packet pairing can be generated every O(1) parallel time
on a q processors EREW PRAM.
Proof. From Lemma 4 we know that a random permutation can delivered with
Pipelined Shuffling every O(1) parallel steps. The algorithm to generate a ran-
dom pairing from it requires dq/2e parallel processors and works as follows. A
separate vector of q memory positions is used to store the final pairing. Each
processor i of the involved processors reads the values x2i and x2i+1 of the posi-
tions 2i and 2i+1 of the permutation, respectively, and then writes into position
2i of the pairing vector the value x2i+1 and into position 2i+ 1 the value x2i. If
q is an odd number, then one position will not be paired. The contents of the
final vector specify for each position the corresponding paired position.
Computational Requirements of the PacketEconomy. A very important
advantage of the PacketEconomy is that the computational requirements of the
flows and the router are tolerable. In contrast to solutions that implement global
auctions between the flows, the PacketEconomy is based on simple interactions
between paired packets. Assuming that the price for each packet trade can be
calculated in O(1) time, in each trading period the work is O(1) for each packet
that belongs to a packet pair, in total O(q). However, all operations are local to
the pairs of queue positions. With appropriate, fairly simple multi-core hardware,
each round can be executed in O(1) parallel time. Further arguments which
support the applicability of our approach to modern routers are presented in
Section 2.3.
5 The Scheduling Problem
The underlying algorithmic problem of the PacketEconomy is a scheduling prob-
lem of network packets. From the router’s point of view, this problem is a single
machine scheduling problem with a max weighted total wealth objective.
Definition 3. Max-Total-Wealth Scheduling (MTW). N jobs ji, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Job ji has processing time pi, release date ri, deadline di and weight wi. Let ci
be the completion time of job i in a schedule. The objective is to find a non-
preemptive schedule that maximizes the total wealth W =
∑
i wi ·max(di− ci, 0).
The release date ri is the time when packet i enters the queue and the deadline
di is the time when the value of the packet becomes zero. Note that the price
used for each trade does not directly influence the sum W (the total wealth).
For MTW on a network router the following assumptions hold:
1. The queue discipline is work-preserving, meaning the router is never left idle
if the queue is not empty.
2. The number of packets that can be in the queue at any time is bounded by
a constant (the maximum queue size).
3. The packet sizes may differ by at most a constant factor. In this work we
assume that all packets are of the same size.
The complexity of the scheduling problem strongly depends on the assumptions
made. Without deadlines, i.e., without a limit on the delay of each packet, an
optimal schedule can be obtained by applying a greedy rule like Smith’s rule [33].
In particular, the router may simply serve in each round the packet with the
largest cost factor ci.
Theorem 4. The MTW problem without deadlines can be optimally solved in
polynomial time.
This holds even for the online version of the problem where the router knows
only the packets in its queue; the greedy rule gives a 1-competitive algorithm.
Theorem 5. There is 1-competitive algorithm for MTW without deadlines.
However, in realistic scenarios with IP packets, there are deadlines. Common IP
packets have a time-to-live (TTL) field. In TCP, a packet that is not acknowl-
edged within the specified timeout period is considered lost. The scheduling
problem for packets with deadlines can be solved off-line as a linear assignment
problem (LAP), where packets are assigned to time-slots (rounds). This approach
is used in [14] for a min-weighted-tardiness problem that is related to the MTW
problem.
Theorem 6. The MTW problem with deadlines can be optimally solved in poly-
nomial time.
5.1 Bandwidth Sharing
Due to the on-line nature and the finite queue size of the PacketEconomy router,
the above classic scheduling algorithms do not seem to naturally fit the MTW
scheduling problem of the PacketEconomy queue. An additional reason is that
for window-based flows, packet transmission is a closed loop. Consequently, the
order in which the queued packets are served influences, if not determines, the
next packet that will enter the queue. Thus, even the online assumption may
not be appropriate. A different approach to study the scheduling problem of the
PacketEconomy is to focus on how the bandwidth is shared between the packets.
In this case we consider the (average) packet rate of the flows, as shown in the
following example.
Example 1. Assume a scenario with window-based flows and 5 economy packets
and 5 business packets. There is a deadline of 40 rounds on the maximum delay of
the economy packets. Moreover, the business packets have to be treated equally.
The same holds for the economy packets. Consider the scenario where each
economy packet will be served with a rate of 1/40 packets/round and delay of
40 rounds and the business flows share the remaining bandwidth; each business
packet is served at a rate of 7/40 packets/round and delay 40/7 rounds. This is
an upper bound on the rate of total wealth for the router for this scenario.
6 The Effect of Trades
In the PacketEconomy, each packet can increase its utility by making trades. To
show the potential of the approach, consider a packet of maximum priority that
pays enough to make any trade that reduces its delay. In the analysis we will
assume that the probability of packet failures is very low, and thus ignore it.
We will focus on window-based flows. We first present an exact calculation for
the average delay of this packet and then derive simpler, approximate bounds
on the delay.
Lemma 5. The average delay E[d] of the packet is
E[d] =
q∑
s=0
s
(
1
q − 2
)s
(s− 1) (q − 2)!
(q − s− 1)! . (3)
Proof. Let rand(L,U, s) be a uniformly random integer in {L,L+ 1, ..., U}\{s}
and pos(p) the current position of packet p. Then, the probability Pr[d > s] is
Pr[d > s] =
s∏
k=1
Pr[rand(1, q − 1, pos(p)) ≥ s− k + 1]⇒
Pr[d > s] =
q − s− 1
q − 2 ·
q − s
q − 2 · · ·
q − 2
q − 2 ⇒
Pr[d > s] =
(
1
q − 2
)s
· (q − 2)!
(q − s− 2)! .
We can now calculate the probability density function Pr[d = s] of the delay s.
Pr[d = s] = Pr[delay ≤ s]− Pr[delay ≤ s− 1]⇒
Pr[d = s] =
(
1
q − 2
)s−1
· (q − 2)!
(q − s− 1)! −
(
1
q − 2
)s
· (q − 2)!
(q − s− 1)! ⇒
Pr[d = s] =
(
1
q − 2
)s
(s− 1) (q − 2)!
(q − s− 1)! .
Applying the definition of the expected value completes the proof
E[d] =
q∑
s=1
s
(
1
q − 2
)s
(s− 1) (q − 2)!
(q − s− 1)! .
Lemma 6. The average delay of the packet does not exceed
−1+2b+2
√
2b(q−2)
2b .
For b = 1 the bound is 12 +
√
2(q − 2).
Proof. A packet that enters at position q − 1 has been served when it advances
at least q positions. Assume b = 1 trading periods per round. Each round starts
with a shift of all packets one position ahead followed by b trading periods. Note
that each random trading partner corresponds to a uniform random number
in [1, q − 1]. To admit a more elegant mathematical treatment we prefer the
continuous distribution. The absolute difference between the expected values of
the discrete and the continuous variables is not larger than one. The same bound
holds for the difference between the expected values of the minimums after k
draws.
Assume a random variable Xc that is uniformly distributed in [L,U ], where
L and U are integers, such that L < U . Let Xd be a random variable that is
calculated from Xc in the following way:
Xd = L+ i,where i is such that : L+ i ·A ≤ Xc ≤ L+ (i+ 1) ·A ,
where A = U−LU−L+1 . The random variable Xd corresponds to a uniform discrete
random variable in {L,L + 1, . . . , U}. The absolute difference Xc − Xd is not
larger than one. Consequently, the absolute difference between the minimum
Xcmin of m draws of Xc and the corresponding minimum X
d
min of the m values of
Xd is also not larger than one. The same bound holds for the difference between
the expected values of the minimums after k draws. Thus, we obtain that
E[Xcmin]− 1 ≤ E[Xdmin] ≤ E[Xcmin] + 1 . (4)
Moreover, note that k >= 1, the average minimum of k random draws will be
in the lower half of the interval [L,U ], that is in [L, L+U2 ]. Real values in this
interval are on average rounded to smaller integer values in the above rounding
procedure for Xc to Xd. Thus, the average discrete minimum will not be larger
than the average continuous minimum. Thus,
E[Xdmin] ≤ E[Xcmin] ≤ E[Xdmin] + 1 . (5)
As shown in the following lemma, the average value of the minimum of these k
draws is (q − 2)/(k + 1).
Lemma 7. Let X1, X2, . . . , Xk be continuous uniform random variables in [0, U ].
Let Xmin be the minimum of these variables. Then E[Xmin] =
1
k+1U .
Proof. The probability distribution of each continuous uniform random variable
Xi is FXi(x) =
x
U . The probability distribution of the minimum Xmin is
FXmin(x) = 1−
k∏
i=1
(1− FXi(x)) .
Now, applying the definition of the expected value function completes the proof.
Back to the proof of Lemma 6, we assume that a packet has just entered the
queue at position q − 1. Consider k, such that the average delay of the packet
is k + 1 rounds. Then, after the k rounds and bk draws the packet advances
for h additional rounds until it is served. Then the total delay of the packet is
k + h+ 1.
The average number of draws until it achieves its minimum is k/2. We add
one to the average minimum, because the minimum position that can be traded
is position 1. Position 0 is the one that is currently served. Let b be the number
of trading periods per router round.
Thus, we have
1
bk + 1
(q − 2) + 1− k/2− h− 1 ≤ 0 .
We solve for k and obtain that the larger of the two roots of k is
k =
−1− 2bh+
√
1− 16b− 4bh+ 4b2h2 + 8bq
2b
.
The total delay k + h+ 1 = −1+2bh√
1+4b2h2−4b(4+h−2q) is minimized at h =
1
2b where
k + h+ 1 =
−1 + 2b+ 2√2√b(−2 + q)
2b
.
For b = 1 we get that the minimum value of k + h+ 1 is
1
2
+
√
2(q − 2) .
The average delay k + 1 cannot be larger then the above value. This completes
the proof of Lemma 6.
The above lemma can be generalized to the case where only one packet in
every c > 0 packets in the queue is ready to sell its position. We simply assume
b/c trading periods per round. In this case the average delay of the business
packet is not larger than 1− c2 +
√
2c(q − 2).
Lemma 8. The average delay of the packet is at least −1+2b+
√
1−8b+4bq
2b . For
b = 1 the bound is (1/2) +
√
4q − 7.2
Proof. Assume k + 1 rounds with b = 1. The continuous average minimum of k
rounds with b trading periods is (q − 2)/(bk + 1). From Equation 5 we obtain
that the average discrete minimum is at least (q − 2)/(bk + 1)− 1. We will add
one to this number because the minimum possible trade is position 1. In the best
case the minimum is achieved with the first draw. In the remaining k rounds
the packet will be (in any case) shifted by k− 1 positions (in each round except
the round when it entered the queue). This number of simple steps/shifts is
subtracted from the min. Finally, a delay of one round is needed to serve the
packet, when it arrives at position 0. Consequently,(
1
bk + 1
(q − 2)− 1
)
+ 1− (k − 1)− 1 ≤ 0 . (6)
From the above inequality and the fact that k is positive we obtain
k ≥ −1 +
√
1− 8b+ 4bq
2b
.
Using b = 1 the expression is simplified to k ≥ −(1/2) + √4q − 7. Thus the
average delay is at least
k + 1 ≥ 1
2
+
√
4q − 7 .
The previous lemma can also be generalized to the case where only one packet
in every c > 0 packets in the queue is ready to sell its position. In this case the
average delay of the business packet is not less than 12 (2−c)+ 12
√
c2 +−8c+ 4qc.
In Figure 4, analytical and experimental results for the delay of the business
packet are presented.
6.1 An Example of the Effect of Trades
The effect of bilateral trades on the overall convergence of an economy is studied
for example in [8]. In this section we examine the social wealth of the PacketE-
conomy for the cases of no trades, trades and an ideal scheduling of the packets.
In our model we do not expect to obtain an optimal solution for every queue
2 There was a minor error in the expression of the bound of this lemma in a previous
version of this work. More precisely, the bound for b = 1 was 1 +
√
q − 1 and the
minor error was that the constant 1 caused by using the continuous minimum instead
of the discrete minimum was not subtracted from the left hand side of Equation 6.
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Fig. 4: Delay of the business packet with respect to the queue size
snapshot. This would be too ambitious given the real-time work load of network
routers and the requirement for O(1) (parallel) time of processing per round.
However, we hope to achieve significant improvements with a lightweight O(1)
time procedure. The theoretical arguments and the experimental evaluation show
that PacketEconomy can support better coordination between selfish network
packets which leads to significant improvements for both flows and routers.
We assume window-based flows and two types of packets, economy packets
and business packets. We examine and compare the cases of no-trades, trades
and ideal trades. The social wealth or wealth rate is the total utility per round.
Note that the money circulating in the economy remains constant and thus the
total utility depends on the values of the packets.
A simple but somewhat surprising result is that if the max value of economy
packets Ve and the max value of business packets Vb are equal then the social
wealth is independent from the scheduling algorithm. Any schedule that respects
the packet deadlines achieves the same social wealth.
Lemma 9. Assume a router queue with two-types of window-based flows, econ-
omy flows and business flows. If Ve = Vb, then the social wealth is the same for
any feasible schedule (by feasible we mean a schedule where no packet exceeds its
delay limit).
Proof. The proof is a direct application of Equation 2.
Let ne be the number of economy packets, Ve their max value, ce their the
cost per round of delay, and de their delay. Similarly, we have nb, Vb, cb, and db
for the business packets. The size of the queue is q = ne + nb.
No Trades When no trades take place then all packets experience the same
delay de = db = d, which is equal to the queue size q. The rate for each packet
is 1/d. The social wealth is utility of the economy packets plus the utility of the
business packets. Each economy packet generates a benefit of Ve − ceq in each
round-trip (from its submission until it is served). The round-trip time of the
packet is equal to its total delay de, which is equal to q. The same holds for the
business packets.
Thus, the delays are db = de = q and the social wealth (total utility gener-
ated) is
ne
q
(Ve − ceq) + nb
q
(Vb − cbq) . (7)
Ideal Trades In the ideal case, the economy packets will consume all their
delay and release in this way as much bandwidth as possible. Note that even
two business packets could consume up to the whole bandwidth (if the other
packets sell). The available bandwidth is then evenly distributed among the
business flows. The social wealth is
ne
4q
(Ve − ce4q) + 4q − ne
4q
(Vb − cb nb4q
4q − ne ) (8)
PacketEconomy Trades Let us start with the case of a queue with one busi-
ness packet, that is, nb = 1 and ne = 99. From Lemma 6, we obtain that
db ≤ 1/2 +
√
2(q − 2) = 14.5. The computationally heavy exact computa-
tion of the expected value gives E[db] = 13.08 and experimental results give
d¯b = 12.8, σ(db) = 6.7.
Let us now consider the case of a queue with nb = 5 business packets and ne =
95 economy packets. From Lemma 8 we get db ≥ 10.41, since the the delay of
each business packet cannot be smaller than for the case nb = 1. Experimentally,
d¯b = 14.5, σ(db) = 7.4. Then
rb =
nb
db
≤ 5
10.41
≤ 0.48 and re = 1− rb ≥ 0.52.
Consequently, the probability that the packet at position i is an economy packet
is at least 0.54. Moreover, the average delay of an economy packet is
de =
ne
re
≤ 95
0.52
≤ 182.7 < 400.
Experimentally, d¯e = 144.7, σ(de) = 61.5. That is, on average an economy packet
is not expected to sell more than 83 rounds of delay. Thus, we can assume that
almost all economy packets will not exhaust their extra delay of 300 rounds.
Consequently, every time the business packet is paired with a preceding economy
packet, the economy packet will be able to trade its position.
However, what is the probability that the trading partner of a business packet
will be an economy packet? There are constantly ne = 95 economy packets in
the queue, but in general these packets will not be distributed uniformly within
the q = 100 queue positions. For example, the concentration of economy packets
might be higher near the end of the queue.
Assume an arbitrary queue round. For i = 0, 1, . . . , 99, let pe,i be the proba-
bility that the packet in queue position i is an economy packet. First note that
pe,0 = re ≥ 0.52 . Moreover, every economy packet that reaches position 0, must
have passed through every other queue position at least once. This means that
for each queue position, the rate of economy packets must be at least re, else
the global rate re would not be sustainable. Thus
for all i = 0, 1, . . . , 99, pe,i ≥ 0.52 .
We can apply Lemma 6 to upper bound the delay db of the business packets.
This time we use c = 1/0.52 and obtain
db ≤ 19.45 .
Again, the delay is significantly reduced compared to the delay of 100 in the case
of no trades. In such scenaria with two types of packets, the business packets
may reduce their delay from q to O(
√
q), which is a significant improvement. It
is of course an interesting problem to study the behavior of the PacketEconomy
approach in more complex scenaria where the queue may contain a blend of
several packet types and examine if then improvements of
√
q are still possible.
Finally, substituting the indicative values Ve = 500, Vb = 1000, ce = 1, cb = 4
and using the bandwidth sharing approach shown in Example 1 we can calculate
the wealth rate of the economy in the example. Recall that the size of the queue
is q = 100 and that the maximum delay for any packet is 4q = 400.
First we consider the case of nb = 1 business packet and ne = 99 economy
packets. In the case of no trades, i.e., a simple FIFO queue, all packets experience
a delay of 100 rounds. In this case rb = 0.01 and the value of the business packet
is 600. The total rate for the economy packets is re = 0.99 and the value of each
economy packet 400. Combining the above gives that the average wealth per
round generated by the economy is 402 (also 402 experimentally).
In the ideal case all economy packets will consume their delay of 400 rounds
to free bandwidth for the business packet. This would mean re = ne/de = 0.2475.
Consequently rb = 1 − re = 0.7525 and db = nb/db = 1.33. The corresponding
wealth rate for the economy would 773.25. Recall that the transfer of budget
from one packet to another does not change the total wealth, and, consequently,
we did not consider how budget circulates.
In the above ideal case the delay for the business packet is 1.33 which is
practically not possible for the PacketEconomy. For q ≥ 2, the delay of any
packet is at least 2; one round to enter the queue and one round to be served.
The best feasible delay for the business packet would be db = 2. Doing the
calculations gives a wealth rate of 647 per router round. In experiments with
1000 trading periods, i.e., 10 times the size of the queue, we achieved a wealth
rate of 644.6 per router round.
For the case of the PacketEconomy with trades with random pairing and
one trading period per round we use the bounds on the packet rates and de-
lays obtained earlier. This gives that the wealth rate is ≥ 431.52 per round
(experimentally, 436.1).
Similarly, for nb = 5 we obtain the wealth rates 410 (also 410 experimentally),
766.25 (766.2 experimentally with 1000 trading periods) and ≥ 515.75 (556.6
experimentally), for no trades, ideal trades, and PacketEconomy, respectively.
Note that the important feature are the self-adjusted packet delay times of the
economy and not the wealth rate itself.
7 Experimental Evaluation
We have performed two sets of experiments in order to verify and quantify
our theoretical predictions. The first set of experiments simulates the scenario
presented in Section 4.1.
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Fig. 5: Mean business flow packet delay (db) comparing PacketEconomy (trading
periods b ∈ {1, 10, 20}) vs FIFO and W 2FQ. The figure consists of four panels
for four values of the business flow cost per round of delay cb ∈ {1, 2, 10, 100}.
In the two bottom panels (cb ∈ {10, 100}) the FIFO flow has been removed for
enhanced clarity.
In this experiment we compare the delay of one one-packet window busi-
ness flow in increasingly large router queues (q ∈ {10, .., 1000}). Firstly, we
compare the mean packet delay of this flow when using PacketEconomy with
cb ∈ {1, .., 100} to using the W 2FQ (Worst-case Fair Weighted Fair Queueing)
[2] algorithm with weights for the flow equal to cb and to using a simple FIFO
queuing policy. In the experiments ce = 1, Ve = 4q, Vb = 4qcb and for each run
we simulated serving 100q packets. The results shown in Figure 5 show a subset
of values for cb since FIFO always performs the same. Also, the PacketEcon-
omy algorithm also performs the same for all cb > 1 and is only different for
cb = ce = 1 since then the delay is identical to FIFO. Finally, W
2FQ progres-
sively decreases the business flow’s mean delay as its weight (= cb) increases.
The conclusion which can be drawn from these experimental results is that PE
outperforms FIFO and that it is comparable to W 2FQ for b > cp.
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Fig. 6: Multiple/ratio of Fair Share used by the business flow comparing Pack-
etEconomy (trading periods b ∈ {1, 10, 20}) vs FIFO and W 2FQ. The plots are
displayed log-log to highlight power functions. The columns vary the business
flow cost per round of delay cb value and the rows the business flow window size
nb value.
Secondly, we examine how much traffic is consumed (packets sent) by the
business flow by comparing the flow’s share of the packets sent to the flow’s fair
share. For the same set of parameters described above, plus the case for nb = 5,
we determine the fair share of a flow fi to be hi = wi/q and the we calculate
the ratio of the fair share taken as
λhi =
ai∑
i ai
1
hi
where ai is number of packets delivered by flow fi. This metric expresses how
much more traffic than it would normally (with FIFO) be able to take up the
flow managed to acquire. The results shown in Figure 6 indicate that, rather
obviously, for cb = 1 the business flow gets its fair share under all algorithms.
However, as cb increases, PacketEconomy is able to provide exponential ratios
of the fair share and for b > cb can even be comparable to W
2FQ.
The second set of experiments examines the quality of random pairing and
trading as a scheduling algorithm. We used a simple queue with business and
economy packets. The business packet utility costs four times more per round
of delay compared with the economy packets. Three cases were examined: a)
no scheduling, i.e., packets are served in order, b) optimal scheduling and c)
random pairing scheduling. Optimal scheduling finds the optimal solution to
this problem.
Utility vs Scheduling Algorithm
QueueForm
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40
60
80
100
Deadline = 4
E1B7 E2B6 E3B5 E4B4 E5B3 E6B2 E7B1
Deadline = 8
E1B7 E2B6 E3B5 E4B4 E5B3 E6B2 E7B1
TradingPeriod
1
2
3
Fig. 7: Utility of random pairing scheduling in comparison with optimal schedul-
ing(max) and no scheduling(min). ExBy denotes x economy packets followed
by y business packets
For the random pairing scheduling case, we performed one, two or three
random trading periods per round to investigate the extent to which multiple
trading periods will improve performance. Two sub-cases were examined, where
the deadline of the economy packets is 4 or 8 rounds. The deadline for the
business packets was always 8 rounds. We also examined whether different queue
compositions would give different results and therefore tested all the possible
business and economy packet queue compositions.
In Figure 7, the error bars represent the optimal scheduling utility (max) and
the no scheduling (min) utility. It can be seen that in all the cases random pairing
performs close to the optimal solution. Additionally, increasing the number of
trading periods yields improved results.
8 Conclusion
We presented a network economy and showed the existence of NE where money
circulates to the benefit of the flows. The computational requirements of a router
that would implement the PacketEconomy approach are at an acceptable level.
This is very important since network routers have to process massive streams of
network packets in real time.
There are several other issues that have to be addressed for our model to
be of practical importance. For example, a greedy flow may submit economy
packets to the network simply to collect money. A realistic economic model
has to anticipate such scenarios and address them with appropriate rules. For
example, a general rule could be that the final final budget of any packet could
be restricted to be non-positive. A more effective rule could impose router-entry
costs on every packet that depend on the current load of the router. The general
topic of countering malicious behavior is of-course a never ending game between
service providers and legitimate users on the one side and malicious entities
or users on the other side. Note that even simple and established flow control
algorithms like AIMD are prone to malicious flow behavior. Finally, the burden
of accounting has also to be handled. For example, determining which network
entities will be responsible for managing currency issues.
Overall, we examined how money can be used at a microeconomic level as a
coordination tool between network packets and we believe that our results show
that the PacketEconomy approach defines an interesting direction of research for
network games. We are currently working on implementing the PacketEconomy
in a realistic network context.
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